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CONFERENCE PROGRAM
MONDAY 15 JULY
08.30 ‐ 19.00 Registration Hotel Lobby, 1/F
14.30 ‐ 17.30 AsFA Boarding Meeting Meeting Room 2, 4/F
18.00 ‐ 20.30 Welcome Reception Taichi Chinese Restaurant, 2/F
TUESDAY 16 JULY
08:30‐‐10:00 CONCURRENT SESSIONS
Session 1. Corporate Finance Theory Meeting Room 210, 2/F
Chair : Artashes Karapetyan, Central Bank of Norway
Product Market Predatory Threats and Contractual Constraints of Debt
Einar C. Kjenstad, University of Rochester
Xunhua Su, Norwegian School of Economics
Discussant: Artashes Karapetyan, Central Bank of Norway
Does Information Sharing Reduce the Role of Collateral as a Screening Device?
Artashes Karapetyan, Central Bank of Norway
Bogdan Stacescu, Norwegian School of Management BI
Discussant: Xunhua Su, Norwegian School of Economics
TUESDAY 16 JULY
08:30‐‐10:00 CONCURRENT SESSIONS
Session 2. International Finance I Meeting Room 1, 4/F
Chair : Hong Zhang, INSEAD
Currency Premia and Global Imbalances
Pasquale Della Corte, Imperial College Business School
Steven J. Riddiough, University of Warwick
Lucio Sarno, City University London
Discussant: Nan Shi, Durham Business School
The Dark Side of ETF Investing: A World‐Wide Analysis
Si Cheng, National University of Singapore
Massimo Massa, INSEAD
Hong Zhang, INSEAD
Discussant: Ting Li, Skidmore College
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Are Investors Compensated for Bearing Market Volatility in a Country?
Samuel Xin Liang, Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
K. C. John Wei, Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
Discussant: Hong Zhang, INSEAD
Causes of Global Imbalances: A Global VAR Analysis
Zhichao Zhang, Durham Business School
Frankie Chau, Durham Business School
Nan Shi, Durham Business School
Discussant: Pasquale Della Corte, Imperial College Business School
TUESDAY 16 JULY
08:30‐‐10:00 CONCURRENT SESSIONS
Session 3. Shiv NaDAR Invited Session Meeting Room 2, 4/F
Chair : Sankar De, Indian School of Business
Asset Pricing with Regime‐Dependent Preferences and Learning
Tony Berrada, University of Geneva
Jerome Detemple, Boston University
Marcel Rindisbacher, Boston University
Short‐Run and Long‐Run Consumption Risks, Dividend Processes and Asset Returns
Jun Li, University of Texas at Dallas
Harold H. Zhang, University of Texas at Dallas
Speculation and Leverage
Mark Loewenstein, University of Maryland
TUESDAY 16 JULY
08:30‐‐10:00 CONCURRENT SESSIONS
Session 4. Empirical Asset Pricing I Meeting Room 3, 4/F
Chair: Kalok Chan, Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
Behavioural Types and Characteristics of UK Fund Managers’ Cascading and Herding: New
Evidence from the Stock Market
Ralph Yang‐Cheng Lu, Ming Chuan University
Hao Fang, Hwa Hsia Institute of Technology
Discussant:Ming Gu, Renmin University of China
Distress Risk, Investor Sophistication and Accrual Anomaly
Ming Gu, Renmin University of China
Discussant: Ralph Lu, Ming Chuan University
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IstheAssetGrowthEffectMispricingorEfficiency:EvidencefromStockIssuanceandBuybackRestrictions
Alan Guoming Huang, University of Waterloo
Kevin Jialin Sun, St. John's University
Discussant: Jianfeng Hu, City University of New York, CUNY Baruch College
Option Listing and the Probability of Informed Trading in the Stock Market
Jianfeng Hu, City University of New York, CUNY Baruch College
Discussant: Alan Huang, University of Waterloo
TUESDAY 16 JULY
08:30‐‐10:00 CONCURRENT SESSIONS
Session 5. Corporate Finance Empirical: Ownership Structure I Meeting Room 5, 4/F
Chair: Zhi Wang, University of Oregon
Are Family Firms Better Performers During the Financial Crisis?
Yanbo Wang, INSEAD
Haoyong Zhou, Keele University
Discussant: Xiaoyan Chen, University of Queensland
Shirkers or Monitors: The Role of Block Institutional Investors in Corporate Cash Valuation
Zhi Jay Wang , University of Oregon
Steven R. Matsunaga , University of Oregon
Jing Huang , University of Oregon
Discussant: Hung Wan Kot, Hong Kong Baptist University
Ultimate Ownership Bank Connections and Collateral in China
Xiaofei Pan , University of Wollongong
Gary Gang Tian , University of Wollongong
Discussant: Chaohong Na , Yunnan University
10.00 ‐ 10.30 Morning tea Foyer, 4/F
TUESDAY 16 JULY
10:30‐‐12:00 CONCURRENT SESSIONS
Session 6. Asset Pricing Theory I Meeting Room 210, 2/F
Chair: Harold Zhang, University of Texas at Dallas
Variance Risk Premium: A Consumption‐Based Equilibrium Approach
Xinwei Ma, Peking University
Jin E. Zhang, University of Otago
Discussant: Jerome Detemple, Boston University
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View Bias Towards Ambiguity, Expectile CAPM and the Anomalies
Wei Hu, Curtin University of Technology
Zhenlong Zheng, Xiamen University
Discussant: Lei Shi, University of Technology, Sydney
Asset Pricing with a Financial Sector
Kai Li, Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
Discussant: Harold Zhang, University of Texas at Dallas
TUESDAY 16 JULY
10:30‐‐12:00 CONCURRENT SESSIONS
Session 7. China’s Financial System: IPO Meeting Room 1, 4/F
Chair: Jian Yang, University of Colorado at Denver
Legal Protection and Underpricing of IPOs: Evidence from China
Jianlei Liu, Kyushu University
Konari Uchida, Kyushu University
Ruidong Gao, Waseda University
Discussant: Tina Wei Li , Hong Kong Polytechnic University
TheDifferential Impact of theBank‐FirmRelationship on IPOUnderpricing: Evidence fromChina
Xiangchao Hao, Nankai University
Jing Shi, Australian National University
Jian Yang, University of Colorado at Denver
Discussant: Peng Wang, Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration
Institutional Environment, Firm Ownership and IPO First‐Day Returns: Evidence from China
Yibiao Chen, Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Steven Shuye Wang, Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Wei Li, Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Wilson H.S. Tong, Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Discussant: Jianlei Liu, Kyushu University
Pyramid IPOs on the Chinese Growth Enterprise Market
Martin Holmen, Göteborg University
Peng Wang, Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration
Discussant: Jian Yang, University of Colorado at Denver
TUESDAY 16 JULY
10:30‐‐12:00 CONCURRENT SESSIONS
Session 8. Behavioral Asset Pricing I Meeting Room 2, 4/F
Chair: Robert W. Faff, University of Queensland
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The Effects of Managerial Extraversion on Corporate Behavior
Na Young Park, University of Oxford
Discussant: Sung Bin Sohn, Peking University
Investor Attention and the Post Earnings Announcement Drift
Ernest Tan, University of Western Australia
Sirimon Treepongkaruna, University of Western Australia
Marvin Wee, University of Western Australia
Jing Yu, University of Western Australia
Discussant: G. Mujtaba Mian, Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Investors’ Selective Attention and Accruals Anomaly
G. Mujtaba Mian, Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Lixin (Nancy) Su, Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Discussant:Marvin Wee, University of Western Australia
What Does Investor Sentiment Reflect: Animal Spirits or Risks?
Sung Bin Sohn, Peking University
Discussant: Jean Jinghan Chen, University of Surrey
TUESDAY 16 JULY
10:30‐‐12:00 CONCURRENT SESSIONS
Session 9. Corporate Social Responsibility I Meeting Room 3, 4/F
Chair: Renée Adams, Australian School of Business at UNSW
Can Socially Responsible Firms Survive Competition? An Analysis of Corporate Employee
Matching Grants
Ning Gong, Melbourne Business School
Bruce D. Grundy, University of Melbourne
Discussant: Ambrus Kecskes, Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
The Effect of Mandatory CSR Disclosure on Information Asymmetry: Evidence from a
Quasi‐Natural Experiment in China
Mingyi Hung, University of Southern California
Jing Shi, Australian National University
Yongxiang Wang, University of Southern California
Discussant: Ning Gong , Melbourne Business School
Can Firms Do Well for Shareholders by Doing Good for Stakeholders? The Importance of
Long‐Term Investors
Ambrus Kecskes, Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
Sattar Mansi, Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
Phuong‐Anh Nguyen, Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
Discussant: Renée Adams, Australian School of Business at UNSW
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TUESDAY 16 JULY
10:30‐‐12:00 CONCURRENT SESSIONS
Session 10.Market Microstructure Meeting Room 5, 4/F
Chair: Shaojun Zhang, Nanyang Technological University
Bid‐Ask Spreads, Quoted Depths, and Unexpected Duration between Trades
Tony Ruan, Xiamen University
Tongshu Ma, Binghamton University
Discussant: Shaojun Zhang, Hong Kong Polytechnic University
TradingRestriction, Tick Size andPriceDiscovery: Evidence fromaNatural Experiment in China
Kalok Chan, Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
Wilson H.S. Tong, Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Shaojun Zhang, Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Discussant: Tony Ruan, Xiamen University
Measuring the Realized Skewness in Noisy Semi‐Martingale with Jumps Using High
Frequency Data
Kent Wang, Xiamen University
Junwei Liu, Xiamen University
Zhi Liu, University of Macau
Discussant: Tom Smith, University of Queensland
12.00 ‐ 13.00 Lunch (Buffet) Taichi Chinese Restaurant, 2/F
13.00 ‐ 14.00 Keynote Address Grand Ballroom, 4/F
Professor Franklin Allen, University of Pennsylvania,
“Finance and Growth in China”
Sponsored by The Australian National University
TUESDAY 16 JULY
14:20‐‐15:50 CONCURRENT SESSIONS
Session 11. Asset Pricing Theory II Meeting Room 210, 2/F
Chair: Jerome Detemple, Boston University
Differences in Opinion and Equilibrium Asset Returns in a Multi‐Asset Market
Xuezhong He, University of Technology, Sydney
Lei Shi, University of Technology, Sydney
Discussant: Xinwei Ma, Peking University
Cointegration of Durable Consumption in Asset Returns
Guojin Chen, Xiamen University
Zhiwu Hong, Xiamen University
Yu Ren, Xiamen University
Discussant: Kai Li, Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
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TUESDAY 16 JULY
14:20‐‐15:50 CONCURRENT SESSIONS
Session 12. Corporate Finance Empirical: Human Capital Meeting Room 1, 4/F
Chair: Richard Ottoo, Pace University
Human Capital, Managerial Overconfidence, and Corporate Valuation
Richard E. Ottoo, Pace University
Discussant: Yu Ren, Xiamen University
Human Capital, Household Capital and Asset Returns
Yu Ren, Xiamen University
Yufei Yuan, Xiamen University
Yang Zhang, Cornell University
Discussant: Richard Ottoo, Pace University
TooMuchConnection CanHarmYourHealth: AnAnalysis of Political Connections and FirmValue
Carl R. Chen, University of Dayton
Luo Danglun Sr. , Sun Yat‐Sen University
Ting Zhang, University of Dayton
Discussant: Stefan Zeume, INSEAD
TUESDAY 16 JULY
14:20‐‐15:50 CONCURRENT SESSIONS
Session 13.NTU invited Session Meeting Room 2, 4/F
Chair: Chuan‐Yang Hwang, Nanyang Technological University
Making It to the Top: From Female Labor Force Participation to BoardroomGender Diversity
Renee B. Adams, Australian School of Business at UNSW
Tom Kirchmaier, University of Manchester
The Brain Gain of Corporate Boards: A Natural Experiment from China
Mariassunta Giannetti, Stockholm School of Economics
Guanmin Liao, Central University of Finance and Economics
Xiaoyun Yu, Indiana University Bloomington
The Effect of Increased Financial Disclosure on Post‐Earnings‐Announcement Drift:
Worldwide Evidence
Mingyi Hung , University of Southern California
Xi Li , Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
Shiheng Wang , Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
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TUESDAY 16 JULY
14:20‐‐15:50 CONCURRENT SESSIONS
Session 14. Empirical Asset Pricing III Meeting Room 3, 4/F
Chair:Mark Loewenstein, University of Maryland
Nominal Price Illusion
Justin Birru, New York University
Baolian Wang, Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
Discussant: Bingxin Li, University of Houston
Depicting the 'Elephant': When All Asset Pricing Models are Blind
Qing Zhou , University of Queensland
Discussant: Nicolas Fulli‐Lemaire , Amundi Asset Management
Dynamic Jump Intensities and Risk Premiums in Crude Oil Futures and Options Markets
Peter Christoffersen, University of Toronto
Kris Jacobs, University of Houston
Bingxin Li, University of Houston
Discussant:Mark Loewenstein , University of Maryland
Allocating Commodities in Inflation Hedging Portfolios: A Core DrivenGlobalMacro Strategy
Nicolas Fulli‐Lemaire, Amundi Asset Management
Discussant: Qing Zhou, University of Queensland
TUESDAY 16 JULY
14:20‐‐15:50 CONCURRENT SESSIONS
Session 15. Financial Institutions I Meeting Room 5, 4/F
Chair: Bang Nam Jeon, Drexel University
Asymmetry Information and Diversification Effect on Loan Pricing in Asia Pacific Region
2006‐2010
Yudi Surya Tanjung, University of Surabaya
Deddy Marciano, University of Surabaya
James Bartle, University of New South Wales
Discussant: Bang Nam Jeon, Drexel University
Shareholder Empowerment and Bank Bailouts
Daniel Ferreira, London School of Economics & Political Science
David Kershaw, London School of Economics
Tom Kirchmaier, University of Manchester
Edmund‐Philipp Schuster, London School of Economics
Discussant: Rui Shen, Erasmus University Rotterdam
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Labor Protection Laws and Bank Loan Contracting
Azizjon Alimov, City University of Hong Kong
Discussant: Tom Kirchmaier, University of Manchester
15.50 ‐ 16.10 Afternoon tea Foyer, 4/F
TUESDAY 16 JULY
16:10‐‐17:40 CONCURRENT SESSIONS
Session 16. Financial Institutions II Meeting Room 210, 2/F
Chair: Tom Kirchmaier, University of Manchester
The Monitoring Incentives of Transactional and Relationship Lenders: Evidence from the
Syndicated Loan Market
Anthony Saunders, New York University
Pei Shao, University of Lethbridge
Yutao Li, University of Waterloo
Discussant: Krishnamurthy Subramanian, Indian School of Business (ISB), Hyderabad
The Role of Bank Regulation in Systemic Banking Crises: Cross‐Country Evidence on Bank
Risk Taking
Frank M. Song, University of Hong Kong
Wensi Xie, University of Hong Kong
Discussant: Dong Xiang, Griffith University
Fundamental Analysis, Mutual Fund Trading and Fund Performance
Rui Shen, Erasmus University Rotterdam
Marno Verbeek, Erasmus University Rotterdam
Yu Wang, IMC Financial Markets & Asset Management
Discussant: Tom Nohel, Loyola University of Chicago
TUESDAY 16 JULY
16:10‐‐17:40 CONCURRENT SESSIONS
Session 17. Corporate Finance Empirical: Product Market Meeting Room 1, 4/F
Chair:Mingyi Hung, University of Southern California
Product Market Predation Risk and the Value of Cash Holdings
Jianxin Daniel Chi, University of Nevada
Xunhua Su, Norwegian School of Economics
Discussant: Hsien‐Hsing Liao, National Taiwan University
Supplier Immobility, Operating Leverage, and Cost of Equity
Jin Wang, Wilfrid Laurier University
Xiaoqiao Wang, Queen's University
Discussant: Ning Gong, University of Melbourne
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Spillover Effects of Earnings Restatements along the Supply Chain
Min Zhu, City University of Hong Kong
Jun‐Koo Kang, Nanyang Technological University
Mandy Tham, Nanyang Technological University
Discussant: Mingyi Hung, University of Southern California
TUESDAY 16 JULY
16:10‐‐17:40 CONCURRENT SESSIONS
Session 18. Empirical Asset Pricing: Liquidity I Meeting Room 2, 4/F
Chair: Ke Wang, Federal Reserve Board
The Illiquidity Premium: International Evidence
Yakov Amihud, New York University
Allaudeen Hameed, National University of Singapore
Wenjin Kang, Renmin University of China
Huiping Zhang, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
Discussant: Ping‐Wen Sun, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics
Foreign Investor Heterogeneity and Stock Liquidity Around the World
Lilian K. Ng, University of Wisconsin
Fei Wu, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics
Jing Yu, University of Western Australia
Bohui Zhang, University of New South Wales
Discussant: Benjamin Junge, Swiss Finance Institute
Liquidity and Price Impact of Financial Distress: Evidence from the Defaulted Bond Market
Song Han, Federal Reserve Board
Ke Wang, Federal Reserve Board
Discussant: Baolian Wang, Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
Identifying Cross‐Sided Liquidity Externalities
Johannes Atle Skjeltorp, Central Bank of Norway
Elvira Sojli, Erasmus University Rotterdam
Wing Wah Tham, Erasmus University Rotterdam
Discussant: Bohui Zhang, The University of New South Wales
TUESDAY 16 JULY
16:10‐‐17:40 CONCURRENT SESSIONS
Session 19. Corporate Finance Empirical I Meeting Room 3, 4/F
Chair: Ambrus Kecskes, Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
CEO Turnover, Financial Distress and Contractual Innovations
John Harry Evans III, University of Pittsburgh
Shuqing Luo, National University of Singapore
Nandu J. Nagarajan, University of Pittsburgh
Discussant: Melanie Buters, Curtin University of Technology
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The Invisible Hand of Short‐Selling: Does Short‐Selling Discipline Earnings Manipulation?
Massimo Massa, INSEAD
Bohui Zhang, University of New South Wales
Hong Zhang, INSEAD
Discussant: Ambrus Kecskes, Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
Bribes and Firm Value ‐ Evidence from Anti‐Bribery Regulation
Stefan Zeume, INSEAD
Discussant: Luo Danglun, Sun Yat‐Sen University
Do Analysts' Preferences Affect Corporate Policies?
Francois Degeorge, University of Lugano
François Derrien, HEC Paris (Groupe HEC)
Ambrus Kecskes, Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
Sebastien Michenaud, Rice University
Discussant: Hong Zhang, INSEAD
TUESDAY 16 JULY
16:10‐‐17:40 CONCURRENT SESSIONS
Session 20. China’s Financial System I Meeting Room 5, 4/F
Chair: Jingjing Yang, Jiangxi Normal University
Do Higher Value Firms Voluntarily Disclose More Information? Evidence from China
Jean Jinghan Chen, University of Surrey
Youchao Tan, Nankai University
Xinsheng Cheng, Nankai University
Stephen X. Gong, Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Discussant: Tao Huang, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics
Mutual Fund Flow‐Performance Relationship Under Volatile Market Condition
Mingsheng Li, Bowling Green State University
Jing Shi, Australian National University
Jun Xiao, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics
Discussant: Gang Xiao, Renmin University of China
Mispricing of Chinese Warrants
Eric A. Powers, University of South Carolina
Gang Xiao, Renmin University of China
Hong Yan, University of South Carolina
Discussant: Meifen Qian, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics
18.00 ‐ 20.30 Dinner (Buffet) Taichi Chinese Restaurant, 2/F
Wednesday 17 JULY
08:30‐‐10:00 CONCURRENT SESSIONS
Session 21. International Finance II Meeting Room 210, 2/F
Chair: Hung Wan Kot, Hong Kong Baptist University
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What Factors Influence the Reverse Cross‐Listing Decision?
Hung Wan Kot, Hong Kong Baptist University
Lewis Tam, University of Macau
Discussant: Tao Huang, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics
Do Multinational Banks Use Internal Capital Markets and How?: Evidence from Bank‐Level
Panel Data in Emerging Economies
Bang Nam Jeon, Drexel University
Ji Wu, Penn State University Harrisburg
Discussant: Deddy Marciano, Universitas Surabaya
Labor Market Regulations and Cross‐Border Mergers
Azizjon Alimov, City University of Hong Kong
Discussant: Jin Wang, Wilfrid Laurier University
Political Uncertainty and Dividend Policy: Evidence from International Political Crises
Tao Huang , Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics
Fei Wu , Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics
Jin Yu , University of New South Wales
Bohui Zhang , University of New South Wales
Discussant: Hung Wan Kot, Hong Kong Baptist University
Wednesday 17 JULY
08:30‐‐10:00 CONCURRENT SESSIONS
Session 22. Behavioral Asset Pricing III Meeting Room 1, 4/F
Chair: Tao Shu, University of Texas at Austin
Incorporation of Public Information: Analysts Versus Managers
Qianqian Du, University of Stavanger
Rui Shen, Erasmus University Rotterdam
K. C. John Wei, Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
Discussant: Qiongbing Wu, University of Western Sydney
Do Local Investors KnowMore? A Direct Examination of Individual Investors’ Information Set
Robert Charles Giannini, BlueCrest Capital Management
Paul J. Irvine , University of Georgia
Tao Shu , University of Texas at Austin
Discussant: Fangjian Fu, Singapore Management University
Informed Trade, Uninformed Trade, and Stock Price Delay
Narelle K. Gordon, Macquarie University
Qiongbing Wu, University of Western Sydney
Discussant: Ping‐Wen Sun, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics
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The Persistence of Long‐Run Abnormal Stock Returns: Evidence from Stock Repurchases
and Offerings
Fangjian Fu, Singapore Management University
Sheng Huang, Singapore Management University
Hu Lin, Peking University
Discussant: Tao Shu, University of Texas at Austin
Wednesday 17 JULY
08:30‐‐10:00 CONCURRENT SESSIONS
Session 23. HKUST invited Session Meeting Room 2, 4/F
Chair: Kalok Chan, Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
Liquidity Costs, Return Smoothing, and Investor Flows: Evidence from a Separate Account
Platform
Charles Cao, Pennsylvania State University
Grant V Farnsworth, Pennsylvania State University
Bing Liang, University of Massachusetts at Amherst
AndrewW. Lo, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Liquidity Premium in the Eye of the Beholder: An Analysis of the Clientele E ffect in the
Corporate Bond Market
Jing‐Zhi Huang, Pennsylvania State University
Zhenzhen Sun, Siena College
Tong Yao, University of Iowa
Tong Yu, University of Rhode Island
Optimal Liquidity Policy
Jennifer Huang, Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business
Jiang Wang, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Wednesday 17 JULY
08:30‐‐10:00 CONCURRENT SESSIONS
Session 24. Corporate Finance Empirical III Meeting Room 3, 4/F
Chair:Millicent Chang, University of Western Australia
The Relation between Corporate Liquidity Holdings and Financial Derivatives Policy
Jiyoon Lee, University of Illinois at Urbana‐Champaign
Discussant: Alexander Vadilyev, The University of New South Wales
Creditor Rights During a Financial Crisis: An Analysis Using Bank Loan Covenants
Sudip Gupta, New York University
Anurag Singh, Indian School of Business (ISB), Hyderabad
Krishnamurthy Subramanian, Indian School of Business (ISB), Hyderabad
Discussant: Peng Xu, Hosei University
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Valuation of Private, Innovative Targets: Evidence from Cisco's Acquisitions
Chandra Sekhar Mangipudi, Indian School of Business (ISB), Hyderabad
Krishnamurthy Subramanian, Indian School of Business (ISB), Hyderabad
Rajkamal Vasu, Indian School of Business (ISB), Hyderabad
Discussant:Millicent Chang, University of Western Australia
What Drives Investment‐Cash Flow Sensitivity Around the World?
Fariborz Moshirian, University of New South Wales
Vikram K. Nanda, Georgia Institute of Technology
Alexander A. Vadilyev, University of New South Wales
Bohui Zhang, University of New South Wales
Discussant: Jiyoon Lee, University of Illinois at Urbana‐Champaign
WEDNESDAY 17 JULY
08:30‐‐10:00 CONCURRENT SESSIONS
Session 25. China’s Financial System II Meeting Room 5, 4/F
Chair: Gary Tian, University of Wollongong
Mutual FundOwnership, Firm Specific Information, and FirmPerformance: Evidence fromChina
Wenhua Sharpe, Deakin University
Gary Gang Tian, University of Wollongong
Hong Feng Zhang, Deakin University
Discussant: Bin Yu, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics
Are Investors Irrational? ‐ Study on China Warrant Market
Yintian Wang, Tsinghua University
Yingzi Zhu, Tsinghua University
Discussant: Shaojun Zhang, Hong Kong Polytechnic University
IPO Delisting and Underwriter Prestige in China
Chi‐Yih Carol Yang, Xi'an Jiaotong‐Liverpool University
Xiaoming Ding, Xi'an Jiaotong‐Liverpool University
Xinru Ni, University of Bristol
Discussant: Gary Tian, University of Wollongong
Float, Speculation, and Stock Price: Evidence from the Share Structure Reform in China
Chuan‐Yang Hwang, Nanyang Technological University
Shaojun Zhang, Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Yanjian Zhu, Zhejiang University
Discussant: Yintian Wang, Tsinghua University
10.00 ‐ 10.30 Morning tea Foyer, 4/F
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WEDNESDAY 17 JULY
10:30‐‐12:00 CONCURRENT SESSIONS
Session 26. China’s Financial System III Meeting Room 210, 2/F
Chair: Terry O'Neil, Australian National University
Mutual Funds’ Holdings and Listed Firms’ Dividend Payouts in China
Jingjing Yang, Jiangxi Normal University
Jing Chi, Massey University
Martin R. Young, Massey University
Discussant : Qiaoqiao Zhu, Australian National University
The Chinese Cash and Stock Dividend Puzzles: Evidence from Joint Earnings and Dividend
Announcements
John G. Powell, Massey University
Meifen Qian, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics
Jing Shi, Australian National University
Discussant: Xiaoyan Chen, The University of Queensland
The Love for Stock Dividends: Chinese Evidence
Haozhi Huang, Australian National University
Rulu Pan, Australian National University
Qiaoqiao Zhu, Australian National University
Discussant: Chi‐Yih Yang, Xi'an Jiaotong‐Liverpool University
WEDNESDAY 17 JULY
10:30‐‐12:00 CONCURRENT SESSIONS
Session 27. Empirical Asset Pricing II Meeting Room 1, 4/F
Chair: Xue‐Zhong (Tony) He, University of Technology, Sydney
Asset Pricing Under Keeping Up with the Joneses and Heterogeneous Beliefs
Xuezhong He, University of Technology, Sydney
Lei Shi, University of Technology, Sydney
Min Zheng, Central University of Finance and Economics
Discussant: Sebastian Schroff, University of Hohenheim
Retail Investor Information Demand ‐ Speculating and Investing in Structured Products
Sebastian Schroff, University of Hohenheim
Stephan Meyer, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
Discussant: Xue‐Zhong (Tony) He, University of Technology, Sydney
The Performance of Individual Investors in Structured Financial Products
Oliver Entrop, Catholic University of Eichstaett
Michael D. McKenzie, University of Sydney
Marco Wilkens, University of Goettingen (Gottingen)
Christoph Winkle, University of Augsburg
Discussant: Lee Smales, Curtin University of Technology
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Time‐Varying Relationship of News Sentiment, Implied Volatility and Stock Returns
Lee A. Smales, Curtin University of Technology
Discussant: Christoph Winkler, University of Augsburg
WEDNESDAY 17 JULY
10:30‐‐12:00 CONCURRENT SESSIONS
Session 28. Corporate Finance Empirical II Meeting Room 2, 4/F
Chair: Krishnamurthy Subramanian, Indian School of Business
Do Firms Follow Their Rivals to Issue a Special Dividend?
May Hu, Curtin University of Technology
Melanie Buters, Curtin University of Technology
Discussant: Shuqing Luo, National University of Singapore
How Do Insider Trading Policies Affect the Returns to Insider Trades?
Millicent Chang, University of Western Australia
Marvin Wee, University of Western Australia
Discussant: Krishnamurthy Subramanian, Indian School of Business
Employee Inside Debt and Firm Risk‐Taking: Evidence from Employee Deposit Program in Japan
Sudipto Dasgupta, Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
Yupeng Lin, National University of Singapore
Takeshi Yamada, University of Adelaide
Zilong Zhang, Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
Discussant: Xiaoyun Yu, Indiana University Bloomington
Shareholder Rights, Managerial Incentives, and Firm Value
Feng Zhang, University of Utah
Discussant: Yunpeng Lin, National University of Singapore
WEDNESDAY 17 JULY
10:30‐‐12:00 CONCURRENT SESSIONS
Session 29. Behavioral Asset Pricing II Meeting Room 3, 4/F
Chair: Fangjian Fu, Singapore Management University
The Convergence and Divergence of Investors’ Opinions around Earnings News: Evidence
from a Social Network
Robert Charles Giannini, BlueCrest Capital Management
Paul J. Irvine, University of Georgia
Tao Shu, University of Texas at Austin
Discussant : Lei Sun, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
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How Does Competition Affect Opinion Dispersion?
Lei Sun, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
K. C. John Wei, Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
Discussant : Tao Shu, University of Georgia
Media and Google: The Impact of Information Supply and Demand on Stock Returns
Yanbo Wang, INSEAD
Discussant : Hiroyuki Aman, Kwansei Gakuin University
Mass Media Effects on Stock Market Liquidity: Television Broadcasting Evidence from
Japan
Hiroyuki Aman, Konan University
Norihiro Kasuga, Kinki University
Hiroshi Moriyasu, Nagasaki University
Discussant: Yanbo Wang, INSEAD
WEDNESDAY 17 JULY
10:30‐‐12:00 CONCURRENT SESSIONS
Session 30. Derivative Meeting Room 5, 4/F
Chair: Charles Cao, Pennsylvania State University
Risk Aversion, Fanning Preference, and Volatility Smirk on S&P500 Index Options
Jian Chen, Xiamen University
Chenghu Ma, Fudan University
Discussant: Emily Lin, St. John's University
Copula‐Based Pairs Trading Strategy
Wenjun Xie, Nanyang Technological University
Yuan Wu, Nanyang Technological University
Discussant: Charles Cao, Pennsylvania State University
An Alternative Way of Examining the Samuelson Effect in Futures Markets
Chia‐Cheng Ho, National Chung Cheng University
Discussant:Wenjun Xie, Nanyang Technological University
The Effectiveness of Changes in Settlement Procedures
Emily Lin, St. John's University
Carl R. Chen, University of Dayton
Discussant: Chia‐Cheng Ho, National Chung Cheng University
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12.00 ‐ 13.00 Lunch (Buffet) Taichi Chinese Restaurant, 2/F
13.00 ‐ 14.00 Keynote Address Grand Ballroom, 4/F
Professor Jiang Wang, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“Noise as Information for Illiquidity”
Sponsored by Zhongnan University of Economics and Law
14.00 ‐ 14.20 AGM Grand Ballroom, 4/F
Wednesday 17 JULY
14:20‐‐15:50 CONCURRENT SESSIONS
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Abstract  
Purpose of this study is to test the asymmetry information influence towards lead 
arranger and participant in syndicated loans. In syndicated loans, lead arranger are 
responsible in the loan establishment and act as intermediary between borrower and 
syndicated members. It cause participant to be highly dependant to the lead arranger. The 
theory predicts that the higher asymmetry information between lead arranger and 
participant will cause participant to expect a higher loan pricing, and a bigger lead share 
will reduce this effect. Conversely, a bigger lead share will resulted in a higher 
monitoring risk and credit risk for the lead arranger, which cause lead arranger to expect a 
higher loan pricing. Therefore, the establishment of loan pricing are affected by two 
opposite effect, asymmetry information effect (participant pricing) and diversification 
effect (lead pricing). 
This study uses two stage least squares (2SLS) to determine the existence of 
asymmetry information effect and diversification effect in loan pricing. This study used a 
sample of the entire LIBOR-based lending in Asia Pacific region for the period 2006-
2010. 
This research shown that diversification effect indeed affecting the loan pricing in 
Asia Pacific, while asymmetry information effect in not proven. This is because Asia 
Pacific loans have a high average lead share (75%) and most of the loans have more than 
one lead arranger. The study also found that lenders tend to consider the economy 
conditions of a nation and previous relationship with the borrower than the financial 
performance of each borrower. 
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Background 
Syndicated loans according to Armstrong (2003), is a type of loan provided by two 
lenders (or more) to provide funds to a specific borrower. In a syndicated loan, some 
lenders are acting as a lead arranger, while other lenders acted as participant lenders. 
Each of these types of lenders has different roles in a syndicated loan (Sufi, 2004). Lead 
arranger is the one responsible to manage the entire process and monitor the borrower in 
the syndicated loan. Once the the borrower and lead arranger agreed for a loan contract, 
lead arranger will offer this syndicated loan to other prospective participant (Dennis and 
Mullineaux, 1999). 
Ivashina (2009) explained that the loan pricing and structure of loan is determined 
through a bidding process between the lead arranger and the participant. This causes 
syndicated loan pricing to be affected by two simultaneous and opposite effects of 
asymmetry information (participant pricing) and diversification (lead pricing). 
Asymmetry information effect is a bias that arises due to the asymmetry of information 
between the participants and the lead arranger, where the higher asymmetry information  
is synonymous with a low lead share thus will encourage the participant to expect a 
higher loan pricing. Diversification effect is a bias that arises due to the asymmetry of 
information between the lead arranger and the borrower, where the higher asymmetry 
information  is synonymous with a higher lead share thus the lead arranger will be 
exposed to a higher credit risk. As a result, lead arranger would expect a higher loan 
pricing. 
Asymmetry information on a loan can be seen from the loan spread value. Ivashina 
(2009) explained that the increase in lead share can reduce asymmetry information 
between the lead and the participant. That is because the lead arranger has better 
information about the loan, while the participant is likely to have limited information and 
rely heavily on information provided by the lead arranger. The higher the share owned by 
lead arranger will encourage a lower asymmetry information that will reduce participant’s 
demand for spread, and vice versa. 
On the other side, Pavel and Phillis (1987) and Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) 
showed that a higher lead share will increase the potency of lead arranger’s credit risk 
exposure. This causes the lead arranger to expect a higher spread to compensate for the 
risks covered (Ivashina, 2009). Demsetz (1999) proved that the diversification of credit 
risk is the reason why the lead arranger trying to minimize the share owned, in order to 
reduce the spread. 
 
Loan Pricing in Asia Pacific  
Figure 1 shows the development of global syndicated loan volume which divided 
into three areas, America, Asia Pacific, and Europe. It is clearly shown that the 
development of global syndicated loans were quite rapidly, even during 2008 and 2009 
financial crisis where there was a very significant decline in loan volume. 
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Source :Dealogic, (2011) 
Figure 1 
Global Syndicated Loans Volume 2006 - 2010 
 
Based on the distribution of syndicated loans in 3 regions, Asia Pacific is a region 
with the lowest transaction level with the volume of € 0.3 trillion - € 0.5 trillion. But on 
the other hand, Asia Pacific has the most stable loan growth compared to U.S. and 
Europe. Asia region still recorded a growth of € 0.1 trillion in 2008-2009 financial crisis 
compared to 2006-2007 period, while the American and European regions recorded a 
decline in loan volume to three fold in 2009. 
The uniqueness of the Asia Pacific also lies in the structure of the loan. Ivashina 
(2009) in his research found that the average share of the lead arranger in the U.S. only 
27% and 98% loan led by one lead arranger only. This differs from the structure of the 
loan in Asia Pacific. Godlewski and Weill (2007) reveal that developing countries like 
Asia have a higher lead share than developed countries like America and Europe. This is 
because the risk of the Asia Pacific region is higher and the information transparancy is 
lower compared to developed countries. Figure 2 shows that Asia has a higher level of 
risk and growth than the U.S. over the past decade. 
 
 
 
Source :OECD, (2011) 
Figure 2 
Asia Pasific and America Economic Growth  
 
Asia Pacific as a region with a high level of risk is also accompanied by the 
disclosure of information which is lower than the U.S. or Europe. This causes moral 
Asia Pacific America 
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hazard to be more common in developing countries in Asia because of high level of 
asymmetry information. Dennis and Mullineaux (2000), suggests that the moral hazard 
are affecting the loan structure. Leland and Pyle (1977), also supports the statement, that 
information is an important factor in determining the loan structure. Thus, asymmetry 
information effect and diversification effect between Asia Pacific and the U.S. can give 
different results. 
The high level and stabil loan growth in Asia Pacific, along with the different 
condition of loan structure between Asia and U.S.,  encourage researchers to conduct 
research on loan pricing establishment as measured by asymmetry information  effect and 
the diversification effect. Ivashina (2009) conducted a study related to the establishment 
of loan pricing in the U.S. and found that the asymmetry information  and diversification 
has a significant influence. Both of these effects are opposite to each other and lead share 
is an endogenous variable that may explain the association of these effects on loan 
pricing. 
Previous studies on the syndicated loan market developed in two directions, ie 
research that leads to the reason for selling loans and research about syndicated loan. The 
research was carried out by Gorton and Pennacchi (1995); and Dahiya et al (2003) where 
they studied the loan oricing establishment on the secondary loan market in the U.S.. The 
results of this study indicate that there is a negative correlation between lead share prices 
and the spread price asked by the bank that will buy the share. This proves that the 
lenders are trying to diversify their credit risk. On the other hand, studies done by Simons 
(1993); Dennis and Mullineaux (2000); Jones, Lang, and Nigro (2000): Lee and 
Mullineaux (2001); Panyagometh and Roberts (2002); Esty and Megginson (2003); and 
Sufi (2005) which focused on the establishment of loan structure found that the 
characteristics of the borrower, the contract characteristics, and availability of public 
information is an important factor in determining the amount of shares owned by the lead 
arranger, number of participant and participant share distribution.  
Furthermore, information transparency issues discussed by Lee and Mullineaux 
(2001); Panyagometh and Roberts (2002), and Sufi (2005) showed an evidence of 
asymmetry information existing between the lead arranger and the participant. Ivashina 
(2009) explained that the weakness of previous studies lies in the loan spread variable 
assumed to be exogenous. As a result, loan structure establishment can cause varying 
interpretations because they can not separate the effect of asymmetry information  and 
diversification effect. 
Important point in the modeling study is the existence of instrumental variables 
that can explain the effect of asymmetry information and diversification appropriately. 
Ivashina (2009) revealed that the lead arranger credit risk is the instrumental variables to 
explain the diversification effect. The higher credit risk lead to a higher lead share in 
loans. That is why the lead arranger will ask a higher price, while the participant demand 
a lower price because the asymmetry in the loan rate will decrease, and vice versa. 
In addition to credit risk, this study also use the lead arranger reputation to capture 
the existence of adverse selection and moral hazard that occurs in the establishment of 
loan pricing. Gorton and Pennacchi (1995), Focarelli et al (2008), Ashcraft and Santos 
(2009), and Ivashina (2009) revealed that differences in the information availability and 
accuracy about the borrower become evidence of asymmetry information existance. 
Gopalan et al (2009), Ivashina (2009), and Mora (2010) revealed that the reputation 
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variables can be variables that can explain the asymmetry of information between the 
lead arranger and the participant regardless of the information derived from the borrower. 
The better reputation of the lead arranger will encourage the participant to join that 
syndicated loan, and lead share will be decrease. Lower rate of lead share will increase 
the potential for moral hazard and adverse selection, so that participant will increase the 
expected spread, as lead arranger will lower the price because of lower credit risk, and 
vice versa. 
 
Syndicated Loan Structure 
Lead arranger that lend loans in Gadanecz (2004) and Sufi (2004) can be divided 
into two general categories: lead arrangers / senior syndicate members and participant 
lenders / junior syndicate members. Lead arranger is generally a bank / other financial 
institutions that already have a pretty good credibility in the manufacture of syndicated 
loan contracts. This group can be led by a one lead arranger or more. Role and function of 
the lead arranger according to Sufi (2004) is to coordinating all administrative activities, 
seeking potencial participant loan lenders, as well as screening and monitoring. 
Participant lenders are members of the syndicated loan. Bank will be referred to as 
participant lenders when the bank is co-funded the loan syndication. Participant lenders 
are rarely negotiate directly with the borrower, and usually use lead arranger to represent 
them (Sufi, 2004). Obtained information about the borrower by the participant is 
generally highly dependent on information provided by the lead arranger (Ivashina, 
2009). 
 
Empirical studies of Syndicated Loan: Asymmetry Information Effects and 
Diversification Effects  
Asymmetry information problem has been recognized since the first decade of 
syndicated loan market. Schumpeter (1939) revealed that lenders not only have to know 
the loan transaction from the financial side, but also must understand the borrower, the 
nature of its business, its business environment, and borrower  conditions that can affect 
the success of the syndicated loan granted. Therefore, the lead bank has a natural function 
to monitore the syndicated loan granted (Mora, 2010). 
Simons (1993); Preece and Mullineaux (1996); Dennis and Mullineaux (2000); 
Jones, Lang, and Nigro (2000): Lee and Mullineaux (2004); Panyagometh and Roberts 
(2002); Esty and Megginson (2003); Sufi (2007); Godlewski and Weill (2007), and Carey 
and Nini (2007) found that loan structure are affected by the availability of public 
information about the borrower which is reflected by the characteristics of the loan 
contract, company's financial performance characteristic, and the macro economic factors 
that affect performance company. 
The different level of borrower information mastery, referred to as asymmetric 
information. Based on the theory, asymmetric information is a condition in which one 
party has information that is not owned by another party. Sufi (2004) argued that the 
party has the advantage of information is the lead arranger and the other party with lack 
of information is the participant. The type of the information are informations that is not 
contained in the financial-statement data, such as the assessment of the borrower’s 
managerial skills, the relationship between the customer with the supplier, or the 
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adaptation ability of borrower in a changing economic conditions (Dennis and 
Mullineaux, 2000). 
Leland and Pyle (1977) explains that the lead share is an evidence of the lead 
arranger responsibility in loan monitoring and this will also make the lead arranger more 
exposed to a credit risk. Ivashina (2009), Mora (2009), and Gopalan et al (2009) reveals 
that the structure of syndicated loans is reflected in the amount of lead share that will 
affect the spread. Therefore, the lead share is an endogenous variable that can explain the 
relationship between the loan characteristic against the establishment of loan pricing. 
Figure 3 shows the relationship between spread and lead share. Point A is the 
equilibrium point between the diversification effect and asymmetry information effect. 
Ivashina (2009) revealed that the formation of lead share in a syndicated loan is 
influenced by two opposing effects that influence each other, namely adverse selection / 
moral hazard effect (asymmetry information effect) and the diversification effect. 
Adverse selection / moral hazard effect showed a negative correlation between spreads 
and lead share. Diversification effect showed a positive correlation between the spread 
and lead share. 
 
 
Source : Ivashina (2009) 
Figure 3 
Relationship between Lead Share and Spread (Asymmetry Information Effect) 
 
Adverse selection problem occurs before the loan was syndicated, where the lead 
arranger has more complete information than the participant, and this causes the lead 
arranger to have a better understanding of borrower’s condition, so that the lead arranger 
can be a better judge evaluate the good and bad of a loan. Moral hazard occurs after the 
loan is given. Basically, the lead arranger is responsible for monitoring the borrower, but 
when borrowing occurs, this responsibility will be reduced due to the share distribution 
among the participant. 
Ivashina (2009) revealed that the adverse selection and moral hazard problem can 
be reduced if the lead arranger has a large proportion of the loan. Leland and Pyle (1977) 
explained that the lead arranger has a better understanding of the borrower’s condition, 
therefore a bigger lead share is a positive signal indicating that the loan has a good quality 
and this will reduce the demand for higher prices from the participant. Bannier (2007), 
B 
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and Ongena, Alkan, and Westernhagen (2007) adds that the addition of the lead share is 
an effective indicator to reduce adverse selection and moral hazard problems in 
syndicated loans, so the data is expected to show a negative relationship between the lead 
share and spread. At point B (Fig. 3), reduction in lead arranger’s credit risk will 
transform the required lead spread lines to the left, thus the lead share will be reduced. 
This reduction indicates a poor loan quality (Leland and Pyle, 1977) and the asymmetry 
of information between the participant and the lead arranger will be higher, therefore the 
participant would expect a higher spread. In contrast to point C (Fig. 3), increased credit 
risk of the lead arranger will transform the required lead spread lines to the right, thus led 
to a higher lead share. It indicates the loan has a better quality (Leland and Pyle, 1977), 
and asymmetry of information between the lead arranger and the participant getting 
lower, so the participant would expect a lower spread. 
 
 
Source 4 
Relationship between Lead Share and Spread (Diversification Effect) 
 
Beside the asymmetry information effect, the loan structure also affected by the 
diversification effect that has an opposite effect. Pavel and Phillis (1987), and Gorton and 
Pennacchi (1995) showed that a higher lead share will increase the lead arranger’s credit 
risk excposure. Point D (figure 4) shows that the lead arranger with good reputation will 
drive participant to join in the loan, so that the required participant spread lines will be 
shifted to the left, this leads to a lower lead share and lead arranger’s credit risk will be 
reduced, so that the lead arranger would expect a lower spread. Point E (Figure 4), lead 
arranger with bad reputation will make participant has a less interest in the loan offered, 
so that the required participant spread lines will be shifted to the right and increase the 
lead share. This increase of lead share will increase lead arranger credit risk, so the lead 
arranger would expect a higher spread. 
Thus, the price formation in the syndicated loan is similar to the demand-supply 
theory, where the price formation occurs at the equilibrium point of asymmetry 
information  / participant pricing and diversification / lead pricing. Ivashina (2009) and 
Mora (2010) says that in order to capture the asymmetry information effect, the need for 
exogenous instrumental variables are transferred from the lead pricing line model in the 
loan without affecting the relationship between lead banks and participant (reputation). 
D 
E 
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Exogenous variables that are being transferred here is the lead arranger’s credit risk. 
Similarly, to capture the diversification effect, the need for exogenous instrumental 
variables to be diverted from participant pricing line model in the loan pricing without 
affecting the credit risk of the lead bank. Exogenous variables that are being transferred 
here is the reputation of the lead arranger. 
 
Methodology 
This study was conducted in two phases. The first is the testing of the control 
variables and instrumental variables relationship to the structure of syndicated loans (lead 
share) via ordinary least squares regression (OLS). The second is the main test in this 
study, which is testing the influence of control variable and instrumental variables in loan 
pricing establishment as measured by lead share. The second test carried out by two stage 
least square regression (2SLS). 
Ivashina (2009) revealed that there are two conditions to obtain a satisfactory result 
from the use of instrumental variables. First, the variable must be correlated strongly to 
the lead share as predicting variable. Second, instrument variable should not be correlated 
with the residual in the 2SLS model. The number of instrument varibale should also 
higher than endogenous variable. 
This condition is a requirement to eliminate the bias that can occur in 2SLS. Bound, 
Jaeger, and Baker (1995) revealed that there are two biases in 2SLS, one is the bias if the 
instrument variables have low correlation to the endogenous variables and the second is 
bias in finite sample. Furthermore, their study also explained that the relationship 
between instrument and endogenous variable is low enough, and it can not be able to 
eliminate bias in finite samples even if we add more sample. 
 
Based on the discussions that have been presented, the research model can be 
described as follows: 
LEAD SHARE = βa Control Variable + βb Instrumental Variable + ε (1) 
LOAN SPREAD = αa Lead Share + αb Control Variable  +  ε  (2) 
Model (1) aims to determine the relationship between control variables and 
instruments variables against the endogenous variable (lead share). In addition this test is 
also conducted to determine the significance of instrument variable, so the bias that 
occurs in the 2SLS can be minimized. Model (2) is the main model of this study, namely 
2SLS with the spread as the dependent variable and lead share as an endogenous variable 
that would explain the effect of asymmetry information and difersification. 
 
 
Variable 
Dependent Variable  
ALL IN SPREAD the variable that shows the price of a loan granted by the lender to the 
borrower. Currency used as a reference is U.S. $ and floating interest rates 
follow changes in LIBOR. 
Endogenous Variable 
LEAD SHARE a variable that indicates the percentage of ownership owned by lead arranger. 
Instrumental Variable (Exogenous Variable) : Credit Risk 
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DOMESTIC BANK a dummy variable indicating whether or not a lead arranger banks derived 
from local / domestic in the loan. This variable is equal to 1 if the domestic 
lead arranger is involveds, and 0 if there is no domestic lead arranger. 
INVESTMENT BANK a dummy variable indicating whether there is lead arranger with the status of 
investment banks in the loan. Variable equal to 1 if the lead arranger in a loan 
has a status of investment bank, and 0 if a given loan is not lead by investment 
bank. Investment bank is a bank whose primary function is to give a loan for 
corporation borrower, with purposes of company financial expansion, 
underwriter, as well as internal funding. 
UNIVERSAL BANK a dummy variable indicating whether there is a lead arranger with the status of 
universal banks in the loan or not, as well as lead arranger with a combination 
status of investment, universal and commercial banks (lead arrangers 
composition in loan establishment in the Asia Pacific tend to have more than 
one lead arranger and part of the loan are led by a bank with a different 
status). Variable equal to 1 if the lead arranger is a universal bank or a lead 
arranger in a loan originated from different types of banks. Variable is 0 if it 
does not meet those criteria (all of the lead arranger are investment bank or 
commercial bank entirely). 
 
Instrumental Variable (Exogenous Variable) : Reputation 
LEAD TO PARTICIPANT a variable that shows the relationship between the lead arranger with the 
participant. This variable is measured by total syndicated loan led by the lead 
arranger for the past three years. 
LEAD PROPORTION a variable that indicates how attractive a loan in the eyes of participants. These 
variables were measured from the ratio of lead arranger and total lender. The 
lower lead proportion indicated a higher participant’s interest, vice versa. 
Contract Characteristic  
LOG (AMOUNT) the logarithm of the largest facilities in every loan granted in the same time 
(per package). 
NUMBER OF FACILITY a number of facilities owned in every loan package. 
MATURITY a variable that indicates loan duration in month. The same like amount, 
maturity value is determined by the largest value in each maturity from the 
loan that are given in the same time (package). 
COLLATERAL a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the loan is given with collateral and 0 if 
the loan is given without collateral 
SENIORITY a dummy variable that will be 1 if the loan is senior and 0 if the loan is not 
senior. 
DISTRIBUTION a dummy variable that will be 1 if the loan is syndicated and 0 if the loan is 
syndicated. 
REFINANCE a dummy variable that will be 1 if the purpose of the loan for refinance and 0 
if the purpose of loan is not for refinance (takeovers, mergers / acquisitions, or 
business development). 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Borrower Characteristic  
TICKER a dummy variable that will be 1 if the borrower listed on the stock exchange 
and 0 if the borrower is not listed on stock exchanges. 
PREVIOUS RELATION a dummy variable that will be 1 if the borrower has borrowed to the same lead 
arranger and will be 0 if the borrower never borrow to the same lead arranger. 
More specifically the determination of whether or not the relationship existed 
is based on historical data from the loan made by a borrower for the past 3 
years. 
RETURN ON ASSETS a variable that indicates the borrower’s level of profitability. Specifically, the 
data used are the financial reports a year before the loan is given. 
DEBT TO ASSETS a variable that indicates the degree of liability of the borrower. Specifically, 
the data used are the financial reports a year before the loan is given. 
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LOG (NET INCOME) a variable that indicates the borrower’s annual net income. Specifically, the 
data used are the financial reports a year before the loan is given. 
 
Country Characteristic  
LOG (SURPLUS) a variable that indicates the size of the annual net income of the country in 
which the borrower resides. Specifically, the data used are the country’s 
financial statements a year before the loan is given. 
LOG (MARKET CAPITAL) a variable that indicates the size of the capital market as a leading indicator of 
a country. Specifically, the data used is the capital market data a year before 
the loan is given. 
COUNTRY RISK an index measuring the risk of a country that is based on credit risk and 
political risk. More specifically, the data used is the country risk data a year 
before the loan is given. 
CORRUPTION INDEX an index indicating a state corruption perceptions from the businesspeople and 
analysts point of view. More specifically, data corruption index are based on 
the previous year data before the loan is given. 
 
Data 
Data in this study were obtained from the dealscan database and the financial 
report of each company. Target population for this study is all companies that make 
corporate loans (borrower) in Asia Pacific from 2006 until 2010 and recorded in the 
database dealscan. Samples taken throughout the loan is LIBOR-based corporations in 13 
countries in Asia Pacific. Listed country for this study are Australia, Cambodia, China, 
Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. Total sample in this study are 1.058 loans 
and 548 loans for financial performance data. 
 
[ insert table 1 ] 
 
Descriptive data in Table 1 show that the average loan total spread is 148.46 basis 
points, while the data with the financial performance had an average spread of 121.74 
basis points. Loans to companies that have financial information has a lower spread loan 
with average value of 26.71 basis points. This indicates that the lenders will provide loans 
with lower spreads on companies that have the financial transparency because in that way 
they will have a better information about the performance and risk of borrower. 
The average percentage of lead share in the Asia Pacific is relatively very high, 
amounting to 75.84% and this value is not much different from the average loan to 
companies with financial data availability (75.52%). This loan structure in Asia is 
different from American who has the average lead share only 27% (Ivashina, 2009). This 
suggests that the risk and asymmetry information in the Asia Pacific is much larger than 
the American. Large lead share indicates that the lead arranger requires greater 
monitoring capabilities towards the borrower because of asymmetry information  between 
borrower and lead arranger and the risks that accompany such loans is very high. 
Based on the lead bank characteristic, 55% of the loan led by the lead arranger who 
has a domestic composition and has no difference for the total sample and the sample of 
financial performance. The existence of domestic banks that have better information 
about the borrower may help the lead arranger in monitoring, and as described by 
Ivashina (2009), better monitoring capabilities can reduce the credit risk of the lead 
arranger. Judging from the bank functions, only 9% of total loans and loans with financial 
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data, led by investment banks, 62.5% led by the lead bank or universal bank which is a 
combination of investment and commercial banks, and the rest are led by commercial 
bank. The low number of lead bank with investment bank function only, indicates that the 
lead arranger seeks to reduce its credit risk, because the function of investment banks 
tend to have lower skills of monitoring than commercial and universal banks. 
Based on reputation characteristic, lead arrangers in the Asia Pacific tend to have 
high reputation, as evidenced by the frequent of lead arranger in charge of a loan. From 
the total data in the past three years, lead arranger averagely lead 85 loans with 67 loans 
as median. While based on the financial data, the lead arranger averagely has 92 loans 
with 84 loans as median. Lead arranger is more often lend to companies with financial 
data because it will be easier to evaluate a loan so the monitoring cost will be lower. The 
better the reputation of the lead arranger may also encourage participant to join the loan. 
Lead proportion variable showed that the average porportion of lead arranger to total 
lenders in a loan is 65% for the overall data as well for financial data. This indicates that 
participants have a high enough interest on the loan in Asia Pacific, because this value is 
lower than the average lead share of 75%. In addition, participants also tend to have high 
levels of trust to lead arranger, as evidenced by the absence of proportion differences 
eventhough the lead arranger has less information about the borrower with no financial 
transparancy. 
 
Ordinary Least Square Analysis 
[ insert table 2 ] 
 
Results of OLS in Table 2 are eligible and bias on 2SLS can be minimized. 
Instrumental variables in this study proved to have a significant effect at 5% and 1% of 
the endogenous variable. The study also estimates the lead share reduction as undertaken 
by Ivashina (2009). Estimation results also found that the critical value for F-test proved 
to have significant value, so the analysis can proceed on 2SLS. 
In OLS model 1, it was found that the domestic lead share variable has negative 
effect on lead share at 1% significance level, it is proved that the existence of domestic 
banks in the lead arranger composition will results in a better monitoring capabilities of 
the lead arranger, so the need for monitoring would be reduced and lead arrenger will 
reduce the lead share. The decline of the lead share will lead to lower credit risk exposure 
for the lead arranger. This finding is consistent with the study of Goldberg, Dages, and 
Kinney (2000) who explained that foreign banks will have better performance in lending 
to developing countries if the foreign bank may cooperate with domestic banks located in 
that country. 
Domestic banks have a better information access about the borrower compare to 
foreign bank. Domestic banks also have better monitoring capabilities than a foreign bank 
because it come from the same country as the borrower. This cause asymmetry 
information about the borrower will be reduced thus the lead arranger will not require a 
high monitoring cost. As a result, the presence of domestic bank will lead to reduced lead 
share. 
Similar results were obtained from model 2 and 3, but the results of statistical tests 
showed no significant effect. The second and third models use data about company with 
financial information. Therefore, both models have a lower level of asymmetry 
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information than model 1. The existence of the company's information led to equally 
owned information held by domestic and foreign lenders, so that foreign lenders do not 
require assistance from domestic lenders to obtain information related to borrower, 
because the asymmetry information related to the borrower has been minimized. 
Investment bank variable has a significant positive correlation at 1% for model 1, 
2, and 3. This suggests that investment bank has poor monitoring capabilities, so they will 
increase the lead share to get a better monitoring ability. In contrast, universal banks 
variable have a significant negative correlation at 1% for models 1 and 2 and 5% in 
model 3. This negative correlation indicates that the lead arranger with mixed functions 
(commercial and investment banks) or lead arranger which has commercial bank as the 
leader in the loan, would have a better monitoring capability so the lead share will be 
decline and credit risk exposure of the overall lead arranger will be reduced as well. The 
results of this analysis in accordance with the statement of Drucker and Puri (2003) which 
revealed that the investment bank has a higher monitoring costs due to weak evaluation 
capability compare to commercial bank. While Gupta, Singh, and Zebedee (2008) adds 
that universal banks are more flexible than an investment bank because the bank function 
are between investment banks and universal banks. 
Lead to participant variable had a significant negative correlation at 1% for model 
1, 2, and 3. This suggests that if a lead arranger is in charge of loan more often, then it is 
identical with a better reputation of lead arranger, and participants’ interest to join the 
loan will be higher. The high interest of participants is reflected in the low level of lead 
share or in the high level of low participant share. This explanation is also supported by 
the findings of the lead proportion variable that has positive and significant correlation at 
1% for models 1 and 2, as well as significant at 5% for model 3. The greater number of 
lead arranger demonstrate that the loan has a greater asymmetry information  about the 
borrower, so the loan is not going to attract participants to join, which cause the 
participant share become lower or lead share become higher. These results are similar 
with the findings of Mora (2010) which revealed that the better reputation of lead 
arranger will attract participant to join in the syndicated loan and this is also indicates a 
high confidence of the lead arranger. In the contrary, a loan that is dominated by the lead 
arranger will be less attractive to participants because it is considered to have high 
asymmetry information . 
In addition to the findings of instrument variables, this study also discusses the 
control variables used in the study and the effect in loan structure establishment. Amount 
variable showed a significant negative correlation at 1% (model 1, 2, and 3). These 
findings are similar with the findings by Ivashina (2009), where the higher amount of 
loan would push the lead arranger to reduce its lead share, aims to reduce the effects of 
credit risk exposure for the lead arranger. Similar results were also indicated by the 
number of facility, where the greater number of facilities offered will negatively affect 
the lead share. 
Maturity control variable has a negative but not significant correlation for the three 
models in table 4. This suggests that the longer loan maturity will lead the lead arranger 
to reduce lead share and vice versa. Negative correlation is consistent with the findings of 
Diamond (1984), where the longer maturities will encourage higher monitoring cost due 
to uncertainty and greater risk. Therefore lead arranger will try to reduce the risk borne by 
reducing the lead share. 
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Refinance control variable showed a significant negative correlation of 1% for the 
three OLS models. The findings are consistent with statement by Wittenberg and 
Moerman (2008) who explained that the lead arranger has a low interest towards a loan 
with refinance purpose because the degree of uncertainty is very low, so the need to 
monitor the borrower will be insiginificant. Refinance is only carried out for companies 
that have poor internal financial performance and borrowed funds are solely used for the 
improvement. This goal is different from the purpose of expansion which tends to attract 
more lenders, because of the degree of uncertainty (mergers, acquisitions, opening new 
businesses) can not be predicted with great accuracy and the return obtained is also likely 
to be high. 
Collateral control variable showed positive and significant correlation at 10% for 
models 1 and 2. This suggests that if there is a guarantee / collateral in the loan, the lead 
share will increase. This is because the existence of the guarantee indicates the high-risk 
loans and this pushed the lead arranger to increase its lead share in order to get a better 
monitoring ability. These findings are similar with result from Berger and Udell (1990) 
and Ivashina (2009). 
Distribution control variable showed a positive correlation but not significant for 
all three models. Syndicated loan is identical with higher lead share as well. These 
findings differ from the expected correlation prediction. Dennis and Mullineaux (1999) 
describe the main reason for a bank to syndicate the loan is the legal limit on the 
maximum amount of a given loan compared to the bank's equity capital. So syndicated 
loans is one of bank methods to avoid overlining in lending. In addition, the syndicated 
decision will bring a diversification revenue for the banks, which is obtained in the form 
of fee income as a lead arranger or participant lenders, so that the lead share will be 
reduced. However, by looking at the findings of this study, we can be concluded that the 
decision to syndicate a loans in Asia Pacific due to lead arranger’s wish to diversified its 
credit risk with other lenders as expressed in Pavel and Phillis (1987) and Gorton and 
Pennacchi (1995). Thus the total share of lead arranger will be higher. 
Seniority control variable showed a negative and a significant correlation of the lead 
share at 5% (model 1) and 1% (model 2 and 3). The findings are consistent with research 
by Godlewski and Weill (2007) which states that the existence of seniority would lead a 
lower need of lead arranger to monitor the borrower, thus the lead share will be reduced. 
Ticker control variable showed a significant negative correlation at 10% for model 
1. This shows that when the lender has borrower’s information that is easily accessible by 
the public, the lead arranger will reduce the lead share, because the lower degress of 
asymmetry information will results in a lower level of lead arranger’s responsibility to 
monitor the borrower. The findings are consistent with the results of Denis and 
Mulleneaux (2000) which revealed that if the borrower is registered in the capital 
markets, it may reduce the lead arranger’s monitoring cost. However, when public 
information is specified in the company's financial statement information, only the net 
income variable that has significant negative effect (10%) towards the loan structure 
establishment. ROA variable gives a negative correlation and D/A provides a positive 
sign according to preliminary estimation, but not significantly. Overall, the better the 
financial performance of the company will push the lead arranger to lose its lead share, 
because good financial performance lead to a lower default risk, so lead arranger may 
reduce the monitoring cost too. 
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Previous relationship control variable is negatively correlated with a significance 
level of 10% for models 1 and 2, and not significant for the model 3. These results 
indicate that if the lead arranger has a previous histroy with the same borrower then the 
lead share will be reduced. This finding is consistent with Sufi (2005) which states that 
the information transparency related to the borrower can be known from the past history 
between the lead arranger and borrower. Lead arranger who has a transactional 
relationship with the borrower in the past will have better information about the 
borrower’s performance, so that the asymmetry information and monitoring cost can be 
reduce. 
Country’s surplus control variable showed a negative correlation, and only 
significant at 1% for model 1. The better the surplus of a country shall encourage the lead 
arranger to reduce its lead share, and vice versa. This is similar to the results obtained 
from financial performance data. Countries with a better surplus indicate a better 
economic condition and chance of uncertainty (default risk) of the borrower will also be 
lower. Capital market variable does not have a significant effect for all three models. This 
indicates that the stock market capitalization is not a leading indicator for the lender in 
determining the loan structure because the lender considers that a country capital market 
conditions may not reflect the country risk and the company's ability to pay its debts. 
CPI showed a significant negative correlation of 1% only for model 1, while model 
2 and 3 were not significant. This shows that higher corruption index will push the lead 
arranger to reduce its share, and vice versa (0 shows the most corrupted country and 10 
shows the less corrupted country). This finding is similar with the research done by 
Lasmono and Marciano (2010) which indicates that the lead arranger will choose to 
syndicate the loan to a borrower that resides in a country with high levels of corruption, 
or in other words, the lead arranger will try to protect themselves by increasing its 
monitoring capabilities. When the level of corruption of a country is very high, then the 
asymmetry information also predicted to be greater, thus the lead arranger will enlarge its 
share. 
Country risk variable shows significant negative correlation of 1% for the three 
models, and made this variable to be the only country variable which consistantly 
affecting the loan pricing establishment. This suggests that the riskier the country, the 
lower the lead share (0 means no risk, and 7 implied the highest risk). The findings of 
country risk is opposite with the results of the CPI, as well as research by Lasmono and 
Marciano (2010) who found that higher risk of loan will cause lead arranger to require 
greater monitoring capabilities. But, on the other side, this study is supported by 
Khrawish, Siam, and Jaradat (2010) research which states that participants will have a 
greater interest in higher-risk loans (high risk, high return). In other words, the 
participant’s interest in these loans will push the lead arranger to reduce its share even if 
this will reduce the lead arranger’s monitoring capabilities. It could also means that the 
low level of monitoring ability is compensated by the lead arranger by adding seniority, 
collateral, collaboration with domestic lead arranger, as well as a good track record. 
 
Difersification effects 
[ insert table 3 ] 
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Table 3 shows the results of the loan pricing establishment from the lead arranger side 
using 2SLS analysis with total sample data. Model 4 is the analysis without using a 
relationship and country charactertistic variable, model 5 is the analysis by adding a 
relationship variable, and model 6 uses overall variable. All three models showed a 
positive correlation with a significance level of 1% for lead share which is endogenous 
variable in this model. The results of this study is similar with findings by Ivashina 
(2009), which shows that the lead share will have a direct relationship to the loan spread. 
Other findings can be seen from a comparison between the model 4.5, and 6. Lead 
share coefficient in model 4 at 2.92 with determination coefficient from this model of 
13.7%. The coefficient of determination coefficient is increased considerably on the 
model 5 to 17.4% with lead share coefficient value dropped to 2.15. This suggests that the 
relationship between the lead arranger for a loan with a borrower in the past can push the 
lead arranger to provide lower loan pricing to the borrower, and vice versa, loans with no 
historical relationship between lead arranger and borrower will lead to a higher spread. 
The reason for this condition is because when the lead arranger does not know well 
about borrower’s information, this will increase the potential for asymmetry information  
between the lead arranger and the borrower, so the lead arranger requires a higher 
monitoring cost. Therefore, to compensate this, lead arranger will ask for a higher spread. 
In the contrary, lead arranger who has known the borrower does not require another 
monitoring cost, so the lead arranger will ask for a lower spread. 
In model 6, table 3, it can be found that the lead share coefficient is 5.12 with 
determination coefficient of 25.46%. This lead share coefficient increased by 2.97 or two-
fold greater than the model 5. Model 6 proved that the role of the country characteristic is 
very high to the lead arranger in setting the loan pricing. An important characteristic of 
loans in Asia Pacific that sets it apart from the loan in the United States and Europe is the 
high level of asymmetry information and risks that accompany such loans. The OLS 
analysis has also proven that the country risk variable is the most influential variable in 
the formation of the loan structure. The magnitude of risk in the Asia Pacific countries is 
causing lead arranger to require greater monitoring costs, so the lead arranger would 
expect higher loan rates.  
 [ insert table 4 ] 
  
Table 4 presents the results of diversification effect for data with financial 
information. The discussion on table 4 will be more focused on the influence of financial 
performance for the lead arranger in loan pricing establishment. Overall, the models 
7,8,9, and 10 indicate that the loans in Asia Pacific have diversification effect because the 
lead share coefficient is significantly positive at 1%. Comparison between the 
determination coefficient for models 7 to 9 and 8 to 10 show that the relationship and the 
country charactersitc has a very large role in shaping the loan pricing despite the 
availability of financial information related to borrower. This is because the loans in the 
Asia Pacific countries and the risk of asymmetry information is greater than the U.S. or 
Europe, so the lead arranger need to properly understand all the risks that could affect the 
ability of borrower to repay the loan. 
In Table 4, the lead arranger coefficient for model 7 is 3.50, while for model 8 is 
3.23. This indicates that the lead arranger with borrower’s financial information will 
reduce the expected loan spread because they already understand the borrower in better 
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ways, and monitoring costs can be minimized. In contrast, lead arranger would expect a 
higher loan spread if this financial information is unknown. Similar results can be found 
in models 9 and 10, but the effect of financial data in the second model is not as big in the 
first model. Lead share coefficient in model 9 is 4.32 and lead share coefficient in model 
10 is 4.28. The only decline is only for 0.04. These results explained that the financial 
performance could reduce expected spread from the lead arranger towards the borrower 
(significant 1%), but the influence from the borrower’s financial information to the lead 
pricing establishment will not be as great as in the first model.  
These findings indicate that the lead arranger in Asia Pacific tend to relay more to the 
past history than the financial information of the borrower. The reason is because in Asia 
Pacific the loan risk is higher, and the business conditions are uncertain. Therefore, the 
lead arranger can not use the company's financial statements only to establish loan 
pricing. The ability of borrower to repay the loan in the past is also a very important 
factor for the lead arranger, because the borrower with a good past reputation are 
expected to have the similar commitment to repay the loan for subsequent loans. 
Lead arrangers in Asia Pacific countries also tend to pay more attention to 
economic condition in which the borrower is located (country risk), because the stability 
of the country would affecting the company's growth in developing countries. This 
variable was shown to get more attention from the lead arranger, compared to the 
company's financial statements. No matter how good the company's financial 
performance, it will have a high risk if the country condition is unstable. 
 
Asymmetry information effects 
[ insert table 5 ] 
 
Table 5 shows the full sample test results of asymmetry information effect. Model 
11 did not include a relationship and country characteristic variables, model 12 just add 
relationship variable, and model 13 uses all variables. Lead share coefficient for model 11 
and 12 are negative in accordance with the expected effect, but the lead share coefficient 
for model 13 is positive. Although lead share coefficient results indicate the presence of 
asymmetry information  effect as found by Ivashina (2009), but all three models indicate 
that there was no significant effect between spread and lead share. This suggests that the 
asymmetry information between the lead arranger and the participant can not be 
statistically proven affecting loan pricing request from participants’ side. 
Comparison between models 11 and 12 also showed that the influence of the 
relationship variables is not as big as difersivication effect influence. The existence of 
relationship between the lead arranger and the borrower can lower the expected spread of 
the participants. Participants will have more confidence in the quality of the loan when 
the loan was offered to the same borrower because they believe the quality of the 
borrower to repay the loan so the risk of unpaid loan is also lower. In addition, the lead 
arranger will not provide loans to a borrower with a bad history. 
Model 13 shows that participants tend to raise the expected loa pricing if there is 
information about the country. In the OLS findings, participants have a high interest in 
high-risk countries. This suggests that even if participants do not have the right to 
monitor the borrower, but they understand that provide loans to countries in Asia Pacific 
has a very big risk and to as a compensation they expect a high return of investment. 
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From these findings, we can obtained several important aspects about loan opricing 
establishment by the participants. First, the participant share for loans in Asia Pacific is 
very low, and largely dominated by the lead arranger (lead arranger share in Asia Pacific 
is 75%), this is different from a loan in the United States and Europe who have a low lead 
share. As a result, the spread of all information in Asia Pacific loan will get better as the 
lead arranger’s share is higher. Therefore, asymmetry information between the participant 
and lead arrangerwill become so low or almost non-existent. Second, lead arranger and 
participants in the Asia Pacific tend to be more than one and already have a smilar group 
(eg loan A has Citi group, BNP Paribas, and Hana Bank as the lead arranger and Standard 
Chartered Bank as participant. On loan B the lead arranger consist of Citi group, Standard 
Chartered Bank, with Hana Bank and BNP Paribas as participants). This condition 
indicates that the asymmetry information between participant and lead arranger is very 
difficult to detect. Participants would expect higher prices because of the relatively high 
risk loans rather than the asymmetry information between participants with lead arranger.  
 
 [ insert table 6 ] 
 
Test results for the financial data in table 6 also shows a similar result with the full 
sample test. Although the lead share showed a negative sign in models 14 and 15, but no 
significant effect between lead share and the spread establishment. The reason of these 
findings is similar with the explanation on the full sample, which is because the lead 
share in Asia Pacific that causes the asymmetry information between the borrower and 
lead arranger is reduce, and lead arranger in Asia Pacific tend to have a relationship that 
is strong enough. Therefore, participants will tend to have high confidence towards the 
lead arranger. As a proof, lead to participant variable in the OLS tests are negative which 
means that the more often lead arranger in charge of a loan, the participants will be more 
interested. 
Comparison of models 14 to 15, and 16 to 17 show that the country information and 
the relationship tends to increase the expected loan pricing of the participants, proved 
from the high level of determination coefficient differences between these two models. 
Explanation of these findings are the same with full sample test, in which the participants 
considered that the loans in Asia Pacific have a high risk, so to compensate they also 
expect a higher return.  
Comparison of models 14 to 16,  and 15 to 17, show that financial information about 
the companies also tend to reduce the expected spread by participants because of the 
borrower’s financial information will lead participants to have a better knowledge of the 
borrower’s conditions so that it is expected to reduce the borrower default risk. Financial 
information will also reduce the asymmetry information between participants and lead 
arranger because these data equally owned by both parties. 
Comparison of four models in table 6 indicate that the previous relationship and a lot 
more attention to the country characteristic are determining the loans pricing compared to 
the financial information company. The explanation for this finding is similar to previous 
findings, namely the risk of lending in the Asia Pacific is very high, mainly due to the 
country’s condition in which the borrower resides. Borrower with current good 
performance does not necessarily indicate that the borrower's risk is low when asymmetry 
information in the country is very high. Therefore, participants will also consider the 
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relationship between the lead arranger and the borrower, because the relationship in the 
past may indicate that the borrower has a good track record in loan payments. 
 
Conclusion 
This study found that loan pricing in Asia Pacific during 2005-2010 influenced by 
difersification effect, and the existence of asymmetry information effect between 
participant and lead arranger were not proven. The main reason is because the loan 
structure in Asia Pacific is 75% established by the lead arranger, so that the lender has 
fully better information about the borrower. In addition, the relationship between the lead 
arranger and the participant tends to be very close, and also there is a group of lenders 
with minor exchange of positions between the lead arranger and the participant, as well as 
the existance of more than one lead arranger. This is different from the loan structure in 
the United States which has average lead share for 27% and has one lead arranger only 
(Ivashina, 2009). 
The 2SLS analysis shows that financial performance has a considerable influence in 
determining the loan pricing, especially for the lead arranger (difersification effect). 
However, when the lead arranger has a relationship with the borrower, the effect of 
financial performance will not be significant. Even by adding country characteristic 
variables, it can be seen that the lead arranger give more attention to the condition of the 
country than the borrower's financial condition. This is because the condition of Asia 
Pacific countries that have a very big risk. Even if a company is performing well, the loan 
will still be at high risk if economic conditions unstable. 
Alhtough the existence of asymmetry information effect between the lead arranger 
and participant is not proven, but the previous relationship and country information tends 
to give an important role for participants during loan pricing establishment. Participants 
will give a lower loan pricing when they know that the lead arranger has lent a loan to the 
same borrower, since a repetitive loan shows the quality of borrower’s debt payments in 
the past. In the contrary, country information will encourage participants to increase the 
loan pricing because participants understand that providing loans in the Asia Pacific 
region are high risk, and they will request a high return to compensate it. This is the main 
reason why loan establishment in Asia Pacific region are very attractive in the eyes of 
participants. 
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full sample observations= 1,058 
 
financial sample observations= 548 
 
differences in 
 
mean ( A ) median ( B ) std. dev 
 
mean ( C ) median( D ) std. dev 
 
mean (A-C) median (B-D) 
all in spread drawn 148.4588763 106 144.0424633 
 
121.7441606 90 106.1187482 
 
26.714716 16.000000 
lead share 75.83558667 86.1878 27.05115202 
 
75.51953501 83.5 26.80273669 
 
0.316052 2.687800 
           contract characteristic 
          
facility lending ammount  212,448,986.66  100,000,000.00  410,193,750.06  
 
234,577,957.04  125,000,000.00  
   
468,152,091.70  
 
  
(22,128,970.38) 
  
(25,000,000.00) 
facility lending ammount (log) 8.031916561 8 0.503211871 
 
8.0867145 8.096910013 0.483739941 
 
-0.054798 -0.096910 
maturity 54.55524079 42 38.66881725 
 
50.75729927 36 34.04115229 
 
3.797942 6.000000 
number of facility 1.331444759 1 0.932840698 
 
1.337591241 1 1.071853155 
 
-0.006146 0.000000 
refinance 0.261567517 0 0.439695932 
 
0.262773723 0 0.440399121 
 
-0.001206 0.000000 
collateral 0.155954631 0 0.36298391 
 
0.113138686 0 0.314771741 
 
0.042816 0.000000 
distribution 0.758262512 1 0.428338332 
 
0.759124088 1 0.427881676 
 
-0.000862 0.000000 
seniority 0.991501416 1 0.091838565 
 
0.989051095 1 0.104156633 
 
0.002450 0.000000 
           borrower characteristic 
          ticker 0.600566572 1 0.490013367 
 
- - - 
 
- - 
previous relationship 0.366383381 0 0.482043586 
 
0.445255474 0 0.49708299 
 
-0.078872 0.000000 
borrower's net income (log) - - - 
 
2.048349428 2.21404795 1.00439038 
 
- - 
return on assets - - - 
 
0.059876835 0.037405542 0.122024175 
 
- - 
debt to assets - - - 
 
0.659081218 0.604046598 0.80978527 
 
- - 
           country characteristic 
          country's surplus (log) 11.84605273 11.90995756 0.531070271 
 
11.89037705 11.91756938 0.480895811 
 
-0.044324 -0.007612 
market capital (log) 11.82613148 11.91321956 1.159689693 
 
12.00965838 11.93719493 0.462174581 
 
-0.183527 -0.023975 
country risk 1.926345609 2 1.632825771 
 
1.724452555 2 1.485035821 
 
0.201893 0.000000 
corruption index 5.028234183 5 2.12961071 
 
5.16879562 5.1 2.076271509 
 
-0.140561 -0.100000 
           lead bank characteristic (credit risk) 
          domestic lead bank 0.545797923 1 0.498133378 
 
0.554744526 1 0.49708299 
 
-0.008947 0.000000 
investment lead bank 0.08687441 0 0.280733838 
 
0.090328467 0 0.28608997 
 
-0.003454 0.000000 
universal lead bank 0.625118036 1 0.484321149 
 
0.651459854 1 0.476127849 
 
-0.026342 0.000000 
           syndicated characteristic 
(reputation) 
          lead to participant 85.25779037 67 63.065593 
 
91.87591241 84 62.08143157 
 
-6.618122 -17.000000 
lead proportion 0.65999715 0.666666667 0.32967829 
 
0.653965979 0.666666667 0.326067072 
 
0.006031 0.000000 
Table 1 
Descriptive Data 
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model 1: full sample observation model 2: financial data (1) model 3: financial data (2) 
 
 
coeff. 
 
t-stats 
 
coeff. 
 
t-stats 
 
coeff. 
 
t-stats 
 contract characteristic 
            facility lending ammount (log) -5.95E-09 -2.901154 *** -7.64E-09 -2.937125 *** -6.91E-09  -2.799301 *** 
Maturity -0.017891  -1.053139 
 
-0.037013  -1.461244 
 
-0.037095  -1.432173 
 number of facility -2.040741  -3.909441 *** -1.852511  -3.166475 *** -1.867523  -3.042412 *** 
Refinance -4.501374  -2.765516 *** -6.708475  -3.310077 *** -7.119299  -3.536327 *** 
Collateral 3.948682  1.78207 * 6.534665  1.825438 * 5.565778  1.496038 
 Distribution 1.333886  0.556908 
 
2.157572  0.643474 
 
2.057595  0.61606 
 Seniority -28.74915  -2.423253 ** -47.47731  -4.521181 *** -47.95163  -4.426922 *** 
                          borrower characteristic 
            Ticker -3.026403 -1.923687 * - - 
 
- - 
 previous relationship -2.919816  -1.807129 * -4.111961  -1.941089 * -3.295112  -1.589246 
 borrower's net income (log) -  - 
 
-  - 
 
-2.225682  -1.817562 * 
return on assets -  - 
 
-  - 
 
-3.18613  -0.644951 
 debt to assets -  - 
 
-  - 
 
1.047294  1.174179 
              country characteristic 
            country's surplus (log) -4.867524 -2.935075 *** -5.694056 -1.339838 
 
-5.759009 -1.342891 
 market capital (log) 0.62608  1.196314 
 
-0.112266  -0.027025 
 
0.006277  0.001494 
 country risk -3.614486  -5.830013 *** -3.030906  -3.771584 *** -3.403861  -4.068656 *** 
corruption index -1.26377  -2.645967 *** -0.969383  -1.445649 
 
-1.001251  -1.472676 
              lead bank characteristic (credit risk) 
            domestic lead bank (z1) -6.853607 -4.422312 *** -2.71721 -1.37947 
 
-2.91789 -1.459455 
 investment lead bank(z2) 23.15872  6.721043 *** 28.20648  6.345085 *** 29.18364  6.559411 *** 
universal lead bank(z3) -12.01077  -5.929177 *** -7.71389  -2.770094 *** -6.872055  -2.450197 ** 
             syndicated characteristic (reputation) 
            lead to participant(z4) -0.056443 -3.842478 *** -0.08337 -4.263368 *** -0.081975 -4.192044 *** 
lead proportion(z5) 21.76488  7.368137 *** 22.25914  5.454977 *** 22.24719  5.457979 *** 
             Instruments 
            z1 = z2 = z3 = z4 = z5 = 0 
  
60.56908 *** 
  
31.39515 *** 
  
30.22758 *** 
z1 = z2 = z3 = 0 
  
56.08026 *** 
  
27.3857 *** 
  
27.37502 *** 
z4 = z5 = 0 
  
38.83498 *** 
  
24.46584 *** 
  
24.35665 *** 
             Adjusted R
2
 0.344568 0.387439 0.389744 
total observation 1058 548 548 
Table 2 
Ordinary Least Square Results 
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Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 
Model 6 
 
 
coeff. 
 
t-stats 
 
coeff. 
 
t-stats 
 
coeff. 
 
t-stats 
 loan structure 
            lead share 2.922742  5.50838 *** 2.148645  3.981636 *** 5.116629  8.023321 *** 
             contract characteristic 
            facility lending ammount (log) 7.26E-09  0.835125 
 
4.62E-09  0.509359 
 
2.50E-08  3.122129 *** 
Maturity 0.063592  0.473373 
 
0.026712  0.203985 
 
0.046207  0.368383 
 number of facility 7.107156  1.963482 ** 7.690526  2.218015 ** 13.86349  4.162673 *** 
Refinance 31.11711  3.303541 *** 34.33066  3.733169 *** 44.37802  5.254799 *** 
Collateral 27.45032  2.095299 ** 20.46765  1.5825 
 
-2.72971  -0.21161 
 Distribution 33.97015  2.895599 *** 23.07088  1.983567 ** 34.23731  3.162533 *** 
Seniority 23.71772  0.343822 
 
13.1661  0.193167 
 
106.932  1.569472 
              borrower characteristic 
            Ticker -61.9232  -6.57447 *** -54.0772  -5.93221 *** -30.3997  -3.50507 *** 
previous relationship 
    
-62.7337  -9.03657 *** -39.4084  -5.96008 *** 
             country characteristic 
            country's surplus (log) 
        
21.35951  2.142756 ** 
market capital (log) 
        
-10.5426  -2.27109 ** 
country risk 
        
34.56226  8.067824 *** 
corruption index 
        
7.931224  2.836852 *** 
             lead bank characteristic (credit risk) 
            domestic lead bank 23.12499  2.745399 *** 14.51404  1.746245 * 44.06063  5.030551 *** 
investment lead bank 8.208194  0.361558 
 
23.34789  1.043706 
 
-56.7041  -2.5208 ** 
universal lead bank 25.86484  1.989463 ** 19.88205  1.54312 
 
50.41446  3.584417 *** 
             Adjusted R2 0.137092 0.174443 0.254623 
total observation 1058 1058 1058 
Table 3 
Lead Pricing: Full Sample  
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Model 7 
 
Model 8 (finance) 
 
Model 9 
 
Model 10 (finance) 
 
 
coeff. 
 
t-stats 
 
coeff. 
 
t-stats 
 
coeff. 
 
t-stats 
 
coeff. 
 
t-stats 
 loan structure 
                lead share 3.498088  7.230433 *** 3.234438  7.013668 *** 4.321262  7.754428 *** 4.284227  7.732159 *** 
                 contract characteristic 
                facility lending ammount (log) 2.30E-08  2.013281 ** 2.89E-08  2.346281 ** 3.65E-08  3.406615 *** 3.75E-08  3.334231 *** 
maturity 0.039376  0.322669 
 
0.011205  0.095676 
 
-0.00149  -0.01384 
 
-0.00935  -0.08669 
 number of facility 9.465412  3.153283 *** 9.276821  3.235762 *** 11.29323  3.999764 *** 11.21132  4.026966 *** 
refinance 48.9276  3.817304 *** 44.83142  3.586991 *** 52.31281  4.480531 *** 52.23919  4.4764 *** 
collateral 39.51869  2.159826 ** 28.80402  1.588933 
 
20.78984  1.254648 
 
18.39194  1.09584 
 distribution 29.68519  2.506872 ** 21.80866  1.843158 * 21.83925  1.947419 * 19.91677  1.778554 * 
seniority 146.8929  5.719439 *** 137.3137  6.248993 *** 228.8154  8.277257 *** 221.4176  8.127181 *** 
                 borrower characteristic 
                previous relationship 
        
-25.2069  -2.77248 *** -23.6003  -2.59013 *** 
borrower's net income (log) 
    
-21.6287  -4.53001 *** 
    
-4.71813  -0.962 
 return on assets 
    
63.74318  1.65584 * 
    
33.70332  1.662127 * 
debt to assets 
    
-11.1151  -3.30838 *** 
    
-11.32  -4.30679 *** 
                 country characteristic 
                country's surplus (log) 
        
6.874863  0.371781 
 
6.426046  0.347067 
 market capital (log) 
        
-26.0793  -1.31008 
 
-23.9693  -1.19901 
 country risk 
        
25.36964  6.321913 *** 24.34053  5.800679 *** 
corruption index 
        
5.217319  1.384882 
 
4.687041  1.243981 
                  lead bank characteristic (credit risk) 
                domestic lead bank 14.71738  1.776513 * 11.89333  1.478078 
 
21.74983  2.758663 *** 20.67492  2.628529 *** 
investment lead bank -61.34859  -2.36815 ** -43.5993  -1.72887 * -90.784  -3.64097 *** -86.9263  -3.49774 *** 
universal lead bank 17.90011  1.536448 
 
25.50145  2.145454 ** 24.40595  2.240564 ** 26.87784  2.366142 ** 
                 Adjusted R
2
 0.146303 
 
0.189211 
 
0.282924 
 
0.292801 
 total observation 548 
 
548 
 
548 
 
548 
  
Table 4 
Lead Pricing: Financial Sample  
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Model 11 
 
Model 12 
 
Model 13 
 
 
coeff. 
 
t-stats 
 
coeff. 
 
t-stats 
 
coeff. 
 
t-stats 
 loan structure 
            lead share -0.204744 -0.496302 
 
-0.31073 -0.759567 
 
0.539274 1.500883 
              contract characteristic 
            facility lending ammount (log) 1.29E-09 0.155068 
 
1.42E-09 0.167607 
 
1.05E-08 1.130556 
 maturity -0.075876  -0.595566 
 
-0.095141  -0.752664 
 
-0.09176  -0.92749 
 number of facility 0.333806  0.104841 
 
1.45144  0.469582 
 
4.255708  1.040462 
 refinance 9.720492  1.116759 
 
14.2039  1.647362 * 20.05521  2.240426 ** 
collateral 25.4111  2.064147 ** 19.85746  1.613992 
 
14.72665  1.399528 
 distribution 20.10252  1.723899 * 16.39048  1.412071 
 
9.126337  0.869905 
 seniority -58.02238  -0.871128 
 
-52.85531  -0.8181 
 
-29.4836  -0.70436 
              borrower characteristic 
            ticker -54.42845 -6.608032 *** -48.99682 -6.044195 *** -36.9248 -4.69293 *** 
previous relationship - 
 
- 
 
-41.81108  -6.971424 *** -36.6995  -4.41142 *** 
             country characteristic 
            country's surplus (log) - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-22.0833 -2.34021 ** 
market capital (log) - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-2.74048  -0.70424 
 country risk - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
14.38385  4.080289 *** 
corruption index - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-1.86423  -0.72638 
              syndicated characteristic 
(reputation) 
            lead to participant -1.02046 -13.76911 *** -0.947984 -12.85722 *** -0.90619 -12.0155 *** 
lead proportion 53.57616  3.013015 *** 53.67003  3.059459 *** 30.5726  1.972006 ** 
             Adjusted R
2
 0.270242 
 
0.286256 
 
0.32729 
 total observation 1058 
 
1058 
 
1058 
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Model 14 Model 15 (finance) Model 16 Model 17 (finance) 
 
coeff. 
 
t-stats 
 
coeff. 
 
t-stats 
 
coeff. 
 
t-stats 
 
coeff. 
 
t-stats 
 loan structure 
                lead share -0.359514 
 
-0.780797 
 
-0.25734 
 
-0.57903 
 
0.123545 
 
0.262503 
 
0.237458 
 
0.50821 
 
                 contract characteristic 
                
facility lending ammount (log) 7.35E-10 
 
0.063328 
 
8.65E-09 
 
0.702075 
 
7.46E-09 
 
0.683561 
 
1.10E-08 
 
1.008248 
 
maturity -0.104011 
 
-0.904166 
 
-0.11918 
 
-1.04718 
 
-0.09654 
 
-0.90122 
 
-0.09683 
 
-0.89563 
 
number of facility 2.347885 
 
0.801852 
 
2.505982 
 
0.893754 
 
4.148163 
 
1.512846 
 
4.216694 
 
1.55495 
 
refinance 17.63968 
 
1.458605 
 
17.0075 
 
1.404599 
 
20.88145 
 
1.846378 * 21.23554 
 
1.852175 * 
collateral 42.12302 
 
2.496844 ** 31.77604 
 
1.896141 * 32.2442 
 
2.111501 ** 27.74636 
 
1.799055 * 
distribution 11.36688 
 
0.906229 
 
7.542987 
 
0.614109 
 
0.464837 
 
0.038726 
 
-0.47189 
 
-0.03978 
 
seniority 15.90708 
 
0.395502 
 
19.99053 
 
0.492693 
 
67.93726 
 
1.919933 * 69.19865 
 
1.968474 ** 
                 borrower characteristic 
                
previous relationship 
        
-26.1192 
 
-3.37136 *** -22.9823 
 
-2.9394 *** 
borrower's net income (log) 
    
-17.4784 
 
-4.09689 *** 
    
-7.54811 
 
-1.63812 
 
return on assets 
    
29.59138 
 
0.902701 
     
7.745971 
 
0.358003 
 
debt to assets 
    
-3.05861 
 
-1.13313 
     
-3.29091 
 
-1.45522 
 
                 country characteristic 
                
country's surplus (log) 
        
6.872574 
 
0.388598 
 
5.851822 
 
0.327525 
 
market capital (log) 
        
-16.5101 
 
-0.91924 
 
-14.6278 
 
-0.80498 
 
country risk 
        
17.60549 
 
4.366415 *** 16.61069 
 
3.911073 *** 
corruption index 
        
4.058694 
 
1.131193 
 
3.653678 
 
1.007222 
 
                 syndicated characteristic 
(reputation)                 
lead to participant -0.92555 
 
-12.63053 *** -0.85365 
 
-11.7711 *** -0.78947 
 
-10.4208 *** -0.75534 
 
-10.0368 *** 
lead proportion 52.99574 
 
2.756724 *** 53.20334 
 
2.861847 *** 39.0229 
 
2.039614 ** 37.83269 
 
1.981668 ** 
                 Adjusted R
2
 0.30511 
 
0.323998 
 
0.371685 
 
0.373284 
 
total observation 543 
 
543 
 
548 
 
548 
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